This study examines how external financing (EF) affects growth in developing countries by distinguishing between two forms of external financing: debt and foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that both types favor growth by boosting investment through the credit channel. However, excessive external debt increases vulnerability to financial crises. Contrariwise, FDI plays an amortizing role by reducing a crisis' effects. The empirical evidence confirms these results and demonstrates that, despite the more secure nature of FDI, mixed financing (debt and FDI) remains more profitable for developing countries because of the inverted U-shaped growth effect of the FDI-to-debt ratio. Moreover, exchange rate stability decreases vulnerability to financial crises, whereas higher stability turns into exchange rate rigidity and thus increases crisis occurrence.
I. Introduction
Our theoretical framework incorporates banking and economic growth mechanisms, models vulnerability to banking and currency crises, and incorporates various choices regarding exchange rate regimes and external financing channels (i.e., FDI versus debt). The study's main theoretical results are as follows. First, the external financing of an economy (through external debt and foreign direct investment) boosts investment through increased credits granted to projects, and thus favors economic growth. Second, a higher level of external debt and bank credits increases vulnerability to financial crises. Third, FDI reduces the recessionary incidence of financial crises.
The study's empirical analysis considers a dataset comprising 67 developing countries selected from among low-and middle-income countries based on the World Bank's classification covering 1972 to 2011 and growth and financial development models using the two-step system generalized method of moments technique and a fixed effects model, as well as three probit panel models (fixed-effects, random-effects, and population-averaged). Our empirical evidence confirms the theoretical results regarding the effects of FDI and external debt on economic growth, the vulnerability to crises, the amortizing effect of FDI during recessions caused by such crises, and the role of exchange rate volatility. However, the evidence also suggests that mixed financing is better for growth than financing by FDI alone, despite its beneficial effects on financial stability and development. Specifically, our empirical analysis reveals an inverted U-shaped growth effect of the FDI-debt ratio, which means that FDI (or debt) increases growth at a certain level of debt (or FDI) but the positive effect declines and becomes negative below this level. Thus, FDI financing, identified as a crisis-prevention measure, can reduce the negative effect of debt financing on financial stability, enhancing its advantages for financial development.
On the contrary, debt financing can slow the decline in the positive effect of FDI financing on growth. This novel result is particularly important, since the literature (e.g., Hamdi and Boukef Jlassi 2014 , Zhou 2017 , Wei 2018 , Boukef Jlassi et al. 2018 ) emphasizes only the virtuous effects of FDI, neglecting the role that debt can play in sustaining these virtuous effects.
Section II reviews the literature and outlines the main contributions made by this study. Section III presents the study's theoretical framework and describes the various channels through which external financing (FDI and debt) affects economic growth, vulnerability to financial crises (banking and currency), and the recessionary consequences of those crises. Section IV presents the study's empirical results. Finally, Section V draws conclusions from the main results of the study.
II. Literature and Contributions
Our article relates to two research strands. The first includes the group of studies on how growth impacts financial openness that distinguish between FDI and external debt channels. Broner et al. (2010) build a standard growth model showing that an economy initially endowed with low capital cannot settle its foreign debt because its debt-to-domestic savings ratio is weak. Drine and Nabi (2010) find that external public debt reduces the size of the formal sector relative to the informal sector through the taxation on capital intended for the reimbursement of annuities. According to the authors, this impact reduces production efficiency because the informal sector is less productive than the formal one. More recently, Okada (2013) shows that FDI financing promotes growth through its enhancement of the quality of institutions in 112 countries observed from 1985 to 2009. Neto and Veiga (2013) find the same result for 139 countries between 1970 and 2009. Later, Lane and McQuade (2014) show a strong correlation between external debt inflows and domestic credit boom for 54 developed and emerging countries from 1993 to 2008, while finding that FDI flows are uncorrelated with this boom. Bekaert et al. (2011) study the impact of capital account opening and equity market liberalization for 96 developed and developing countries between 1980 and 2006, finding positive effects of all types of financial liberalization on GDP growth and productivity.
The second strand of the literature to which this article belongs includes studies analyzing the effects of financial openness on financial crises. Kharroubi (2007) analyzes the impact of external private debt on growth in the context of imperfect capital markets with moral hazard.
He shows that maturity mismatch in capital markets translates into macroeconomic fluctuations and may generate liquidity crises, and that financial development mitigates the negative effects on growth caused by macroeconomic fluctuations but not those caused by the crises. Hamdi and Boukef Jlassi (2014) show that a high ratio of foreign debt liabilities to total liabilities increases the likelihood of banking crises for a panel of 58 developing countries between 1984 and 2007. The same results are found by Tong and Wei (2010) , and Boukef Jlassi et al. (2018) .
Financial Openness and Growth in Developing Countries: Why Does the Type of External Financing Matter? 431 Lee et al. (2016) prove that all foreign capital flows increase the vulnerability to currency and banking crises. Zhou (2017) argues that over-borrowing and sudden stop problems arise only with external financing through short-term debt. Furthermore, Wei (2018) 
III. Theoretical Analysis

A. Economic environment
We consider a single-good economy with two periods and three discrete time dates, t = 0, 1, 2. The single good used for consumption and investment could be produced through a two-period project. There is a continuum of mass 1 of risk-neutral agents who live for two periods and are endowed with the initial quantity of the good. There is a competitive banking system featuring access to short-term storage technology and financing for two-period risky projects.
The economy is open to FDI. The unit of account is the consumption (investment) good.
Agents
There is a continuum of mass 1 of agents. Each agent is endowed with   units of the good, which the agent deposits in the representative bank in the form of a demand deposit contract. Agents are initially uncertain about their time preferences. Each one will know only at date    whether the agent is an early consumer who only wants to consume at date    or a late consumer who only wants to consume at date   . This time preference is private information possessed by the consumer and not observable by the bank. Hence, late consumers can pretend to be early consumers and withdraw their deposits at date    if they will obtain a return higher than what they would obtain by withdrawing at date   . At date   , each agent has a probability γ to be an early consumer and a probability   γ to be a late consumer.
Therefore, the ex ante preferences of a consumer can be represented by:
where   denotes consumption at date    and    is the discount factor. The utility function u(.) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. In ex ante terms, the expected utility of a consumer is:
Production technologies
There is a continuum of mass 1 of two-period projects, which need two-period bank loans in order to be undertaken. The projects are identical and exposed to idiosyncratic risks. A project succeeds with a probability of  and fails with a probability of   . If successful, the project generates a return factor equal to   , and it equals zero in case of failure. The average gross return is therefore   . The uncertainty regarding the success or failure of each investment project is alleviated at the mid of the production cycle   . A project that is liquidated before maturity at    faces a liquidation cost that reduces the gross average return to   .
There is also a risk-free storage technology that transfers one unit of the good from one period to another without depreciation. For risk-neutral banks, the projects conducted until their maturity are more attractive than the storage technology. 
Representative bank
There is a competitive banking sector represented by a bank that finances the projects. The bank provides credits () out of the deposits (  ), the savings of the lenders, and foreign debt (  ). It contracts in foreign currency from the international market at a fixed interest factor,       (    represents the debt in domestic good where   serves as a spot exchange rate expressing the value of one unit of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic good).
The raison d'être of the bank in this model is the diversification of projects' idiosyncratic risks.
Hence, by financing the continuum of projects, the bank can diversify its assets such that the proportion of successful projects at each date is known and equal to  (by the law of large numbers). The lenders deposit their initial wealth   in the representative bank in exchange for a demand deposit contract (  ,   ), allowing them to withdraw either   units of the consumption good at date    or   units at date   . The bank again serves as liquidity insurer. Since the deposit contract is not contingent on project success or failure, the bank invests its resources in a portfolio (, , ) wherein  represents the amount stored to hedge against the liquidity risk.  represents the premium paid to hedge the bank's short position in foreign currency (      ) against the appreciation of the foreign currency (which corresponds to      ), as given by:
where  is the unitary premium per unit of foreign currency. If the foreign currency appreciates, the hedging institution transfers to the bank the amount           (this could be thought of as hedging using a call with a strike equal to the spot exchange rate   and a premium ).
We assume that borrowing from the international market, hedging against the foreign exchange risk, and investing in domestic projects are beneficial, which corresponds to the following condition:
Therefore, the portfolio (, , ) of the bank satisfies the following conditions:
Equation (5) expresses the equality between the resources and expenditures of the bank, including the total premium paid for hedging the foreign exchange risk. Condition (6) indicates that the liabilities of the bank at date    are covered by the amount invested in the storage asset. Condition (6) signifies that the output of the project and the amount received from the hedging institution in case of foreign currency appreciation,
enables the bank to pay its late depositors the constant amount   and reimburse the loan it obtained from international creditors. Given the expression (3) of , Equation (5) could be rewritten as follows:
Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate (the constant appreciation of the foreign currency) in Equation (7) could be rewritten as follows:
Since the banking system is assumed to be competitive, our representative bank will offer the demand deposit contract (  ,   ) that maximizes the expected utility (2) of each agent under constraints (5') to (7'). Therefore, using the first-order optimal condition, this contract is completely determined by the following Equations:
For simplicity, we consider a logarithmic utility function   ln . From Equations (8) and (9) we obtain:
Given Equations (7'), (10), and (11), we obtain ∂∂    and ∂  ∂      , which means that borrowing   on the international market increases the credits allocated to the projects as well as the consumption level. Moreover, under the condition    and given that the utility function is concave, using simple algebra on Equations (8) and (9) reveals that      . Hence, late consumers have no incentive to declare that they have obtained   early and store it to consume at date 2. Therefore, even if the bank cannot identify each depositor's type, the latter will reveal it in normal times.
Growth of the capital stock
In addition to the projects financed through the banking system, other projects are undertaken by foreign investors though FDI equal to . We assume that these projects have the same characteristics as those undertaken by domestic entrepreneurs. Hence, the stock of the capital good at the end of the second period is given by:
and the growth factor   is given by:
where  is determined by Equations (7'), (10), and (11).
Proposition 1
The external financing of the economy (through external debt and FDI) boosts the credits granted to the projects and increases economic growth.
Proof. It can be easily shown that ∂ ∂   and ∂ ∂        using Equation (12) and simple derivatives of  and  given by (10) and (11). As we will see, however, external financing through debt increases vulnerability to financial crises.
B. External financing, vulnerability to financial crises, and economic recession 1. Exchange rate and exchange rate regime
The value of the exchange rate is determined by the equilibrium of the balance of payments:
where        with    represents elements of the balance of payments except the reimbursement of external debt. This depends on the production level of the economy  and is assumed to increase as the value of the domestic good depreciates in terms of the foreign currency. The initial spot exchange rate   equilibrates the balance of payments at date   , so that            , or, equivalently,      . In normal circumstances, no evolution of the exchange rate happens at date    (hence      ), and the exchange rate   at the final date is given by:
The solution to Equation (15) is given by:
with   given by (12) and the parameter  suitably chosen to reflect the sensitivity of the trade balance to the depreciation of the domestic good's value in foreign currency. The economic agents expect this foreign currency appreciation, which is the rationale justifying the bank's hedging of its short position. It is this expected evolution of the exchange rate that justifies the bank's recourse to hedging its short position in foreign currency.
Definitions 1
i) Under a rigid exchange rate regime, the exchange rate  is announced to fluctuate within the band     . In this case, the bank cannot hedge its short position against the appreciation of the foreign currency beyond   .
ii) Under a flexible exchange rate regime, no upper bound is fixed for the exchange rate , and the bank is hedged against any level of foreign currency appreciation.
Negative economic shock and banking and currency crises
We assume that an unexpected macroeconomic shock    reduces the gross return of the projects to   ε. Domestic and foreign depositors observe a signal at date    revealing this macroeconomic shock. As a consequence of this shock, the bank's assets are impacted, and the revenues it is able to collect equal    . The macroeconomic shock also pushes the foreign exchange rate beyond   . It is easy to show using Equations (15), (16), and (12) that the new exchange rate  ′  is given by: 
It is clear that the appreciation of the foreign currency beyond   increases as the shock impacting the domestic projects increases ( is given by [16] ). In the case of a rigid exchange rate regime, the bank is not completely hedged against the appreciation of the foreign currency to the level  ′  . At date   , its liabilities increase by the amount of the uncovered appreciation ′        . Therefore, its balance sheet (7') (at   ) becomes:
where       represents the readjusted reimbursement to late domestic depositors that the bank is obliged to make in order not to default on its foreign debt and to repay the entire amount
Simple algebra using (7') and (18) enables us to determine the new reimbursement of late depositors    which is strictly inferior to the initial contractual level   :
It is clear that    decreases as the shock  increases.
Definitions 2
i) A currency crisis is defined by the appreciation of the foreign currency beyond the expected level   .
ii) A banking crisis (bankruptcy) occurs at date t=1 when late domestic depositors trigger a bank run, which obliges the bank to liquidate all the projects prematurely and partially default on its domestic obligations to its domestic depositors.
Due to the shock, the proportion    of late consumers might have an incentive to withdraw their deposits prematurely while claiming they are early depositors, asking for   , and storing it during the second period. The rationale behind this behavior is the loss that would impact their saving       and the possibility of receiving greater reimbursements by claiming they are early consumers (as the bank cannot identify their actual depositor type).
This precautionary reaction causes a bank run, which in turn impacts the foreign exchange rate. Even if foreign creditors have no incentive to withdraw their savings prematurely (assuming they are guaranteed the repayment       whatever the evolution of the exchange rate), their early reimbursement at    forces the appreciation of the foreign currency beyond the expected level   . In normal circumstances, the amount of savings requested by the bank's early domestic depositors equals   . Amid a bank run, however, all the agents ask to withdraw their deposits prematurely        . The bank cannot satisfy this demand since its liquid assets are insufficient     . Therefore, it is obliged to liquidate its assets  invested in the two-period projects, obtaining only     due to the additional liquidation cost of      .
Taking into account the reimbursement of the external debt, the amount    available to domestic depositors during a bank run is given by:
where ρ″    ρ′  is an additional appreciation of the foreign currency due to the additional liquidation shock caused by the bank run. Using (17'), the new exchange rate level is determined by:
Proposition 2.
i) Financial crises occur when the unexpected shock of the balance of payment generates an initial appreciation of the foreign currency  exceeding   given by
ii) A flexible exchange rate reduces vulnerability to financial crises.
iii) A higher level of external debt   increases vulnerability to financial crises.
iv) Foreign direct investment that improves economic performance reduces vulnerability to financial crises.
v) The recessionary effect of financial crises decreases as the FDI level decreases but increases as bank credits increase.
Proof of Proposition 2. See appendix.
Financial Openness and Growth in Developing Countries: Why Does the Type of External Financing Matter? 439 Figure 3 shows the zones of vulnerability to financial crises 
IV. Empirical Evidence
A. Data and models
We test the validity of our theoretical predictions regarding the impact of FDI financing and debt financing on growth in developing countries through the credit and financial crisis channels using an unbalanced panel comprising yearly data on 67 low-and middle-income countries 1) from 1972 to 2011 2) based on the classification used by the World Bank. 3) The World Bank considers that a country is low-income if its GNI per capita is lower or equal to 935 US dollars.
A country is considered to have lower-than-average income if its GNI per capita is no less than 936 US dollars and no more than 3,705 US dollars. A country is considered to have a higher-than-average income if its GNI per capita is between 3,706 US dollars and 11,455 US dollars. A country is considered to be high-income if its GNI per capita exceeds 11,456 US dollars. The countries with higher-than-average or higher incomes are characterized by a level of economic and financial development as well as an institutional quality that is higher than that of other countries. These two groups are mainly comprised of developed and emerging economies. Thus, excluding them from our sample enhances its homogeneity. We have also removed five middle-income countries different models are estimated: growth and financial development models, estimated via the two-step system generalized method of moments technique; and a fixed effects and financial crises model -estimated using fixed-effects, random-effects, and population-averaged probit methods.
Growth model
Through this growth model, we examine the effects of external financing variables separately and in their interaction (between FDI and debt) on economic growth. We consider the real GDP per capita (GDPPC) as an indicator of economic growth following recent empirical studies on the relationship between financial and long-run growth in developing countries-particularly Aghion et al. (2009) , Neto and Veiga (2013) , and Ahmed (2016) . This dependent variable is explained on the basis of six indicators of external financing: FDI stocks of assets and liabilities to GDP (FDI); FDI stocks of liabilities to GDP (FDIL); FDI stocks of assets to GDP (FDIA); debt stocks of assets and liabilities to GDP (DEBT); debt stocks of liabilities to GDP (DEBTL);
and debt stocks of assets to GDP (DEBTA). We also control for the sum of exports and imports to GDP (TRADE); the lack of price stability 4) (STAB-PRICE); government spending as a share of GDP (GOV); secondary school enrollment 5) (EDUS); and the population growth rate (POPG).
These control variables, apart from being used in the recent empirical literature, are selected
following several studies on the phenomenon of economic growth, since they have been proven robust by Sala-I-Martin (1997), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004), Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) . We consider data from two sources to collect these variables: The World Development Indicators database (WDI) for the dependent and control variables and the External Wealth of Nations dataset (EWN) for the external financing variables. The model can be expressed as:
where  represents the indicators of external financing (FDI, FDIL, FDIA, DEBT, DEBTL by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Boyer (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) , and we compute robust two-step standard errors using the methodology proposed by Windmeijer (2005) . We make this choice to avoid potential endogeneity problems (i.e., measurement errors, omitted variables, simultaneity), address the potential correlation between country-fixed effects and the error term, and resolve the weak instrument problem 6) (Roodman 2009a , 2009b , Bun and Windmeijer 2010 . We also use robust standard error estimations in the fixed effects to test the robustness of the baseline GMM system results.
Financial development model
We test our theoretical prediction that FDI and external debt increase credits and might thus promote economic growth using the empirical model of Baltagi et al. (2009) . In contrast to these authors, however, we distinguish between external financing variables according to their nature (FDI versus debt). The model can be expressed as:
where CPRIVET represents domestic credit to the private sector (percent of GDP) according to WDI; EF x TRADE is the interaction term 7) between the sum of exports and imports to GDP and the external financial indicators; '  is a constant; '  is the country-specific effect;
'  is the time-specific effect; and    is the error term. Indicators  and  represent the countries (   … ) and the periods (   … ), respectively. All of the explanatory variables are one-period lagged (L.).
We utilize the same GMM system estimator as that used for the growth model, and we verify its robustness by fixed effects estimations.
Financial crises model
We develop a financial crisis model to examine three main outcomes from our theoretical 6) The validity of the GMM system estimator is conditioned by i) the quality of the chosen instruments (Hansen-test) and ii) the non-autocorrelation of errors of order two (AR2) in the equation in difference. The P-values of the Hansen-test and AR2 test confirm these conditions for all regressions, as reported in the related tables. Following Roodman (2009a Roodman ( , 2009b , we restrict the moment conditions by using the Stata command "collapse," which guarantees a small number of instruments (exogenous independent variables). The number of instruments is thus lower than the number of groups (countries) in all of the regressions. This technique resolves the instrument proliferation problem. 7) As indicated by Baltagi et al. (2009) , this interaction term is useful for capturing the simultaneous openness hypothesis. Indeed, the total effect (margin and direct) of a higher EF or TRADE can be measured by calculating the partial derivatives of CPRIVET on EF and the partial derivatives of CPRIVET on TRADE.
model. In the first, a higher level of external debt and bank credits increases vulnerability to financial crises. In the second, FDI reduces the incidence of crises. In the third, a rigid exchange rate increases financial crises. To construct our empirical framework, we follow the Furthermore, to measure the likelihood of crisis occurrence, we calculate a dummy variable of financial crises (FCRISES):
FCRISIS is explained by the external financing variables (EF), the exchange rate stability 9) variable in level and squared forms (ERS and ERS 2 ), and the six control variables: GDP growth (GROWTH); growth of money and quasi money to total reserves ratio (M2/RESEG); growth of claims on private sector to GDP (CLAIMPRIVG); life expectancy at birth in total years (LIFE-EXP); the domestic credit provided by the financial sector to GDP (FINCREDIT); and the lack of price stability (STAB-PRICE). All of the explanatory variables are one-period lagged (L.) and extracted from the WDI database. The model can be expressed as follows: (26) Thus, FCRISES is a dichotomous variable. The model therefore becomes non-linear, and the probability of a financial crisis can be estimated through the fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), and population-averaged (PA) panel probit models 10) (Greene 2012) . Thus, we can express our model as follows:
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Thus,   takes the value of 1 if country  in period  experiences a banking crisis (BC) or a currency crisis (CC) or a twin crisis (TC)-in other words, a banking crisis and a currency crisis at the same time-and 0 otherwise. Following Greene (2012) , the log-likelihood function of our financial crises model is written as follows:
B. Results and discussion
We start our discussion by interpreting the results of our baseline estimates (see Tables   1 to 6) , which show the direct and indirect effects of FDI and debt financing separately (FDI versus debt). Then, based on the conclusions drawn from these baseline outcomes, we study the suitability for growth of mixed financing (FDI and debt) relative to FDI or debt financing alone (see Table 7 ). 10) According to Davidson and MacKinnon (1984) and Greene (2012) , the validity of a panel probit model can be verified using i) a Wald Test and ii) the value of a log-pseudolikelihood statistic (RE) or log-likelihood statistic (FE). These conditions are attained at a 5% level at most in all of our regressions, as reported in the related tables. 
FDI financing versus debt financing
There are four main results to be drawn from the estimates of the three models (22, 23, and 25; growth model, financial development model, and financial crisis model) described above (see Tables 1 to 6) .
First, the coefficients of the FDI and FDIL variables are significant and positive in all of the regressions of our growth model, as shown in Table 1 . This reflects the positive impact of FDI financing on growth. Moreover, the coefficient of the variable FDIA is non-significant.
This means that, unlike liabilities, FDI assets do not promote GDP growth because they are are statistically significant and positive in all of the regressions of the financial development model. Thus, FDI financing increases the private credit supply. As a consequence, we can assume that this type of external financing promotes growth by increasing the private credit supply, as predicted by the theoretical model. Table 3 also shows that the coefficients associated with the terms of the interaction between FDI financing and the sum of exports and imports to GDP (      ) from regression (1) Table 5 indicates the negative impact of this type of financing on the likelihood of financial crises. Once again, this finding confirms our theoretical predictions, especially the proposition that FDI decreases vulnerability to financial crises. In addition, the coefficient of the variable FDIA is positive and significant in regressions (8) and (9) in Table 6 . This means that, unlike liabilities, FDI assets may increase vulnerability to financial crises because they can be assimilated to foreign capital flight, which may increase the risk of a sudden stop.
Second, Table 4 , DEBTA has a positive and significant coefficient.
This result could occur because the inflow of the interest on external debt assets may encourage the domestic financial sector to grant more credit. All of these empirical findings corroborate our theoretical proposition that the external financing of the economy (through external debt and FDI) boosts credits granted to projects. However, Table 4 shows that the marginal effects Table 4 . Moreover, unlike its positive effect on private credit, external debt financing has a perverse effect on financial stability. Indeed, Table 6 shows that debt financing increases the probability of financial crisis because the coefficients of DEBT and DEBTL are positively significant in regressions (1) to (6). Overall, therefore, the ambiguous effect of debt financing on growth is explained by two contrary impacts: on the one hand, the positive impact of debt financing on private credit development and, on the other, the positive effect of debt financing on the occurrence of financial crises.
Third, in Tables 5 and 6, the exchange rate stability indicator (SEXCH) is characterized by Only the estimates of the growth model (see Tables 1 and 2) , the financial development model (see Tables 3 and 4) , and the financial crisis model (see Tables 5 and 6 ) remain to be interpreted in terms of their control variables. We highlight three main points. First, it seems that the coefficients of the control variables, when significant, are consistent with our theoretic
L.GROWTH (Notes) Dependent variable is a financial crisis dummy; regressions are estimated using the fixed-effects (FE; Stata commands probit, vce(cluster Countries)), random-effects (RE; Stata commands xtprobit, re), and population-averaged (PA; Stata commands xtprobit, pa vce(rob)) probit models with robust errors; standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient. Marginal effects (Stata command margin) and the coefficients of the constant are reported; *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Second, the coefficients of the control variables included in the financial development model (see Tables 3 and 4) Third, the coefficients of the control variables of the financial crisis model (see Tables 5 and 6) are the same as those in the model of Lee et al. (2016) . The coefficients of GROWTH are negative, which means that crises are less recurrent in periods of economic prosperity characterized by high production. Those of M2/RESEG are positive, which suggests that there is a strong chance that a sudden stop will turn into a financial crisis. The fact that the coefficients of CLAIMPRIVG are positive shows that the vulnerability of the economy to private sector default may increase the likelihood of financial crises. The coefficient of the variable LIFE-EXP, which is the economic development proxy and appears in the empirical model of Lee et al. (2016) , is negative. According to Barro (2001) , this means that macro-financial turbulence, particularly crises, are more likely to occur in developing countries characterized by lower human capital quality. Finally, the coefficients of FINCREDIT are positive, which indicates that crises follow lending booms. This empirical finding corroborates our theoretical proposition that a higher level of credit increases vulnerability to financial crises.
Mixed financing
Having demonstrated and empirically explained the superiority of FDI financing to debt financing in terms of growth and its effects on credit and crises, we now examine whether mixed financing (FDI and debt) is more profitable for growth than financing by FDI alone.
For this purpose, we construct two sub-models (22a and 22b) from our baseline growth model (22) . This captures the growth effects of mixed financing by FDI and debt, as well as the interaction of these two sources of external financing (sub-model 22a) and the potential inverted U-shaped growth effect of the FDI/debt ratio (sub-model 22b) in order to demonstrate why mixed financing is preferable (or not) for growth than FDI financing (model 22b). The two sub-models can be expressed as follows:
where FDI-F represents the indicators of FDI financing (FDI, FDIL or FDIA), and DEBT-F represents the indicators of debt financing (DEBT, DEBTL or DEBTA); FDI-F x DEBT-F is the interaction term; FDI-F/DEBT-F indicates the ratios of FDI financing to debt financing (FDI/DEBT, FDIL/DEBTL or FDIA/DEBTA);   is a constant; µ  indicates country-specific effects;
λ  indicates time-specific effects; and ε  is the error term. Indicators  and  represent the country (   … ) and period (   … ), respectively.
As in our baseline growth model, we regress these two sub-models using the GMM system dynamic panel data estimator, including the correction provided by Windmeijer (2005) . The outputs of these estimates are shown in Table 7 . They highlight that the magnitudes of the positive and significant coefficients of variables FDI and FDIL are higher than those presented in (1) and (2) in Table 7 , the coefficients of DEBT and DEBTL become positive and significant, respectively (0.007; p-value < 10% and 0.039; p-value < 5%), whereas they were characterized by negative and non-significant coefficients in Table 2 (-0.022; p-value < 10% and 0.013; p-value > 10%). This means that the joint presence of FDI and debt financing and their interaction reduce the negative effects of debt in terms of financial instability and reinforces their positive effect on financial development, thus promoting economic growth. A second argument therefore pleads in favor of mixed financing rather than FDI financing.
Moreover, regressions (1) and (2) in Table 7 Markowitz (1952) . This result also leads us to assume that the marginal effect of the FDI-to-debt ratio on growth is negative, which means that there is a threshold FDI-debt ratio at which FDI financing becomes negative for growth and more debt financing is therefore needed to improve it. From another perspective, it can be assumed that there is a threshold FDI-debt ratio at which debt financing becomes positive for growth due to the existence of more FDI
financing. Our assumption is tested and verified via the outputs of regressions (4) and (5) in 
V . Conclusion
This study provides an all-encompassing theoretical and empirical analysis of the direct and indirect effects of external financing on financial development, crises, and growth in developing countries. It shows that the external financing of an economy might boost investment through an increased availability of credit, thereby fostering economic growth. Moreover, FDI improves Seo and Shin (2016) .
This will be the focus of future research.
The case of a flexible exchange rate regime can be obtained from Equations (19) and (21) by setting ρ′  ρ″  ρ (this is a mathematical artifice that signifies only that the bank does not need to secure additional resources above the transfers received by the hedging institution).
The new expressions are obtained by the equations below, illustrated in Figure 4 . iii) A higher level of external debt   increases vulnerability to financial crises.
Using (28), (29), and (30), we can show the following properties:
Financial Openness and Growth in Developing Countries: Why Does the Type of External Financing Matter? 461 Figure 5 . Effect of increased external debt on vulnerability to financial crises vi) Foreign direct investment that improves economic performance reduces vulnerability to financial crises.
Hence, FDI, which enables projects to have higher return  and higher probability of success, improves the aggregate economic performance of the economy and improves its resilience against negative economic shocks.
vii) The recessionary effect of financial crises decreases with the level of FDI and increases with banking credits.
In financial crises, the stock of capital (   ) is given by an equation analogous to (12) taking into account the liquidation of the projects financed by the bank's credit . Hence:
Recalling that    θ  , the recessionary effect of the crises is given by:
It is clear that higher FDI dampens the recessionary effect of financial crises. The opposite effect takes place through banking credits. (p-values) (0.4313) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0230) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0079) (0.8219) (0.5445) (0.4710) (0.0000) Appendix 4. Correlation coefficients (2/2)
